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This paper presents and estimates a model to explain the official discount rate of the Central 
Bank of Austria-Hungary from the beginning of 1876 to the end of 1913. Changes in the discount 
rate are assumed to depend on changes in the liquidity ratio of the Bank, defined as the ratio of its 
stock of metals to banknotes issued, and on changes in foreign discount rates. The equation 
estimated can be considered a reaction function of the Bank, taking into account the objectives of 
monetary policy. In order to gain a deeper insight into the factors which led to discount rate changes 
the paper also presents the estimates of an equation explaining the determinants of the liquidity 
ratio.  
Changes in the discount rate were the most important instrument of monetary policy.  There 
were 50 such changes during the period considered2. A second instrument was the changes in the 
criteria for admission to rediscounting by commercial banks and of borrowing by the non-bank 
private sector which at that time had also access to the Bank’s credit. The Bank of Austria-Hungary 
also intervened in the foreign exchange market to avoid excessive fluctuations of the national 
currency. In addition it used the so-called gold devices which changed the conditions of imports and 
exports of gold3. 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a Laurea dissertation presented by Gianluigi Celli on March 17 1999 at the University of 
Brescia entitled “Le determinanati del tasso di sconto della banca centrale dell’impero austro-ungarico durante il gold 
standard (1876-1913): un’analisi econometrica” and written under the supervision of the first author. We thank Hannah 
Nielsen for research assistance.  
2 The discount rate changes were 221 in Great Britain, 136 in Germany and 35 in France. 
3 Gold devices were used by Central Banks to avoid sales and exports of gold and/or to make these operations more 
costly to the private sector. They consisted in raising the sales price of gold, moving the delivery of gold to places 
distant from the border, delivering minted national coins instead of ingots and increase the interest rates on lending to 
gold exporters in order to increase transaction costs. 
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 For the period 1880-1913 Bloomfield (1959) showed that there was an inverse relationship 
between annual discount rates and liquidity ratios for a large number of gold standard Central 
Banks. Goodhart (1972) used a more sophisticated approach to study the link between the official 
discount rate of the Bank of England and her liquidity ratio. Using monthly data from 1891 to 1914 
he regressed the level of the discount rate on her liquidity ratio, the lagged discount rate and 
seasonal dummy variables. He confirmed Bloomfield’s result about the negative relationship. His 
explanation of this negative correlation was that when the liquidity ratio was falling, the Bank of 
England became more concerned about maintaining internal convertibility and would thus increase 
the discount rate to attract gold from internal circulation and from abroad. 
 Sommariva and Tullio (1987) analysed the factors which influenced the Reichsbank’s 
decisions to change the official discount rate from 1876 to 1913 using for their econometric analysis 
data which refer to each discount rate change enacted by the Reichsbank and contained in a rather 
rare volume published in 1925 in Berlin by the German Imperial Printing Office and entitled 
“Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik” (henceforth VN). This data, which had never been used before, 
cover four gold standard countries (Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Austria-Hungary) 
using the same criteria for all four countries and contain, besides discount rates and liquidity ratios, 
also data on exchange rates and private (commercial bank’s) discount rates. Sommariva and Tullio 
(1987) found, like Goodhart (1972) for the Bank of England, that the Reichsbank reacted negatively 
and with a lag to changes in the liquidity ratio, which implies that its main objective was to 
maintain internal convertibility of notes issued into gold4. 
 Before proceeding further it is important to spend a few words about the numerous and 
significant changes which occurred during the period under analysis in the monetary system of 
Austria-Hungary. While Great Britain, Germany and to a large extent also France maintained for 
the whole period full convertibility of banknotes issued by their respective Central Banks into gold, 
the same is not true for Austria-Hungary.  Austria-Hungary adopted internal convertibility of 
banknotes into gold only in 1902. It had struggled since the beginning of the period (1876) to 
accumulate enough gold and gain greater control over paper issues to enable it to formally join the 
gold standard. The 1902 adoption of convertibility was reached gradually in successive steps. This 
                                                 
4 The conclusion that the main objective of the Bank of England and of the Reichsbank was to keep internal 
convertibility of banknotes outstanding should not come as a surprise: if the Reichsbank managed to keep internal 
convertibility of its banknotes for over 38 years, and the Bank of England for even longer, it is rather obvious that this 
objective must have been very important for them. 
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stands in sharp contrast with Germany’s introduction of convertibility which was completed in just 
a few years (1871-1876), after massive purchases of gold in world markets5.  
 Austria-Hungary had a silver standard until March 1879 and an inconvertible paper currency 
until 1902. Other important dates in the monetary developments of the empire were: 
- July 1, 1878, when the “Compromise” (statute of the Central Bank) of 1867 was renewed for 
another 10 years and the powers of Hungary over the management of the Bank were increased. The 
name of the Bank was changed from “Austrian National Bank” (Oesterreichische Nationalbank) to 
“Austro-Hungarian Bank” (Oesterreichische-Ungarische Bank),  it became a bilingual institution 
with two main offices in Vienna and Budapest and the governor was to be appointed by the 
Emperor upon joint nomination of the Austrian and Hungarian finance ministers (Flandrau, 2003). 
- 1892, when a monetary reform was begun which introduced a new currency (the gold crown), 
fixed its value in terms of gold and took steps to stabilize the florin in terms of the crown (gold) by 
centralizing the issue of paper currency at the Bank6.  
- 1896, when the Bank, feeling that its gold stock was sufficiently high, began to shadow the 
gold standard by intervening with foreign exchange in the foreign exchange market and by keeping 
the value of the national currency within the theoretical gold points, roughly corresponding to a 
band of +/-1%. Its value with respect to the main gold standard currencies, which had fluctuated 
within a range of about 15% from 1876 to 1891 and 8% between 1892 and 1895, began to fluctuate 
after 1896 within the much narrower band of about 2%. Only for the period 1896-1913 it makes 
sense to speak of a central gold parity of the Austrian crown.  
- September 21, 1899 when the charter of the Bank was renewed again, this time until 1910. 
Hungary was granted full parity with Austria in the management and control of the Bank and the 
quarrelling between the two sides of the empire, which had lasted for many years, finally came to 
an end. With the uncertainty regarding the future of monetary circulation within the empire thus 
removed, the 1892 monetary reform, setting the ground rules for the move to the gold standard, 
became credible at last.  The boost in confidence which resulted from the September 21, 1899 
renewal of the Bank charter was so high that large capital and gold inflows occurred from the main 
financial markets of Europe (London, Paris and Berlin). These centres all felt the strain and had to 
increase their discount rates several times between October 1899 and December 1900 (see Tullio 
                                                 
5 However, Germany’s decision to adopt the gold standard in the early 1870’s and its actual move in 1876 was faciliated 
by the requisitioning of part of the French gold stock after the victory over France in 1871 and by large reparation 
payments.   
6 Silver coinage on account of the two governments was discontinued and it was decided that the two governments 
would repurchase with gold the 312 million florins of government paper notes outstanding. Austria was to repurchase 
70% and Hungary 30%.  
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and Wolters, 2003). In addition in the first decade of the 20th century the Austro-Hungarian 
currency was quoted above parity most of the time.  
- 1902, when Austria-Hungary formally joined the gold standard by allowing full (unrestricted) 
convertibility of banknotes into gold. By now the gold stock and the reserves of foreign currencies 
of the Bank were so abundant and the credibility of the Bank so high that the gold crowns 
introduced into circulation returned to a very large extent to the Bank. From August 1901 to 
December 1907 the equivalent of 1616,4 million gold crowns were coined and put into circulation. 
On December 31, 1907 1381,7 million or 85,5% had returned to the Bank. The explanation is that, 
owing to a high level of confidence on the part of the public and the fact that during the years of 
inconvertibility the citizens of the empire had become accostumed to the advantages of using paper 
currency as a means of payment. Among the factors which contributed to the high credibility of the 
Bank and a high confidence in its banknotes were the stabilization of the new currency in the 
foreign exchange market already reached in 1896 and the abundant gold stock of the Central Bank. 
The ratio of metals to notes issued by the Central Bank increased from 53.0% on average during the 
period 1876 to 1895 to 74.9% during the period 1896 to 1913. At the same time the ratio of gold to 
all metals in its coffers increased from 36.4% to 78.1%7.   
 This brief historical overview of monetary developments in Austria-Hungary from 1876 to 
1913 clarifies that the period was not homogenous from the point of view of the institutional 
(monetary and exchange rate) set-up. Its inclusion in this introduction is also important to 
understand possible breaks in the estimated equations. The historical overview may at first sight 
suggest that the institutional changes were so large that it is impossible and meaningless to estimate 
single equations explaining changes in the discount rate and changes in the liquidity ratio for the 
whole period. Yet, the overview should also make it clear that, despite these large institutional 
changes, there was one paramount concern on the part of the Bank of Austria-Hungary throughout 
the period, namely to defend and increase the stock of metals. In this respect the behaviour of the 
Bank was not much different from that of Central Banks which managed to keep full convertibility 
of their banknotes into gold for the whole period. This hypothesis is also confirmed by the fact that 
the compilers of VN (1925) put Austria-Hungary on exactly the same footing as Great Britain, 
Germany and France since the set-up of the table for Austria-Hungary does not differ from that of 
the other three countries; also the sample period is exactly the same. In any case in estimating our 
two basic equations we always kept the institutional changes in mind and tried to model whenever 
possible potential structural changes. 
                                                 
7 These averages are computed using the data from VN and they refer to the 50 episodes of changes in the discount rate 
enacted by the Bank of Austria-Hungary during the period. For more detail see Section 2.  
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 The main novelties of the paper are first, that it is the first econometric study on the 
determinants of the official discount rate and of the liquidity ratio in Austria-Hungary covering the 
period of 1876-1913. Second, with respect to the previous literature on the other main gold standard 
countries, we go several steps further by estimating a more complete reaction function of the Bank 
of Austria-Hungary which includes, in addition to the liquidity ratio, also foreign discount rates and, 
for the period after 1895, deviations of the market exchange rates from gold parity. This will show 
to what extent monetary policy in Austria-Hungary was influenced by foreign discount rate 
changes, which were the foreign countries influencing the financial market of Austria-Hungary and 
how highly integrated was the financial market of Austria-Hungary with the rest of the world. 
Third, instead of using annual or monthly data, like in all previous studies, except Sommariva and 
Tullio (1987), we use the data published in VN. Since we have the same data set for four gold 
standard countries we could also make meaningful international comparisons. Fourth, we study the 
stability of the equations determining the discount rate and the liquidity ratio over time and this will 
give us interesting insights into the changes in the working of the monetary system in Austria-
Hungary. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the models explaining the changes of 
the Bank of Austria-Hungary’s discount rate and liquidity ratio, taking into account international 
influences including the state of the foreign exchange market. Section 2 describes the data used and 
how the variables have been constructed. Section 3 presents the estimates and the stability tests of 
the reaction function of the Bank of Austria-Hungary. Section 4 presents the estimates and the 
stability tests of the equation explaining changes in the liquidity ratio. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. The model 
 Following Bloomfield (1959), Goodhart (1972), Sommariva and Tullio (1987) and Contamin 
and Denise (1999) we present in this section two equations explaining the Bank of Austria-
Hungary’s discount rate (the reaction function) and its liquidity ratio. Like in the literature cited 
above, the official discount rate is assumed to depend on the liquidity ratio. However, in order to 
check the assumption of multipolarity of the gold standard as suggested by Eichengreen (1992) and 
Tullio and Wolters (1996) and to measure the degree of  financial openness of Austria-Hungary, a 
set of variables were included in the equation capturing international influences (exchange rates 
and foreign official discount rates). 
 The changes in the official discount rate of Austria-Hungary )i( AD  are assumed to depend 
on the level of the narrowly or broadly defined liquidity ratio )l( i , on its changes )l( iD  (where 
1i =  stands for the narrow and 2i =  stands for the broad one), on the changes in the official 
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discount rates in Great Britain )i( ED , Germany )i( DD  and France )i( FD  and finally, only from 
1896 onwards, on the percentage deviation of the exchange rate of the Austro-Hungarian currency 
with the British Pound from its gold parity *E
*
EE
E e/)ee(w -= . The gold parity *Ee  became 
meaningful for Austria-Hungary only from 1896 onwards for the reasons explained in the 
introduction.   
The equation to be estimated is thus:  
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j
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where 2,1i = ; j=D,E,F and D  stands for a change of the variable. In this case D  does not denote 
the usual difference operator, since in our data set the changes refer to differently spaced time 
points. The residuals are denoted by  u. 
 In estimating equation (1) two different definitions of the liquidity ratio have been  used, the 
first is the ratio of the gold and silver stock of the Bank of Austria-Hungary to  banknotes issued 
)1( 1 , and the second has the same numerator but includes in the denominator sight liabilities in 
addition to banknotes issued )l( 2 . By comparing the goodness of fit and the stability of the 
estimated regressions we will be able to make some inferences about which ratio may have been of 
greater importance to the Bank. 
 The expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are: negative for the 
changes in the liquidity ratio, negative for the level of the liquidity ratio, positive for the changes in 
foreign official discount rates, and positive for the deviation of the exchange rate from gold parity. 
The exchange rate is defined as the number of domestic currency units per Pound; hence an 
increase in Ee  indicates a devaluation of the Austro-Hungarian currency (capital and gold outflows 
from Vienna). 
 For the exact definition of the variables and for the time span to which their changes refer see 
Section 2. Suffice to mention here that the series used are not equidistant time series but they refer 
to timely ordered episodes of all official discount rate changes which occurred during the period.  
 The level of the liquidity ratio has been introduced into the equation in order to verify 
whether at high levels of gold reserves the Bank of Austria-Hungary was reacting less than at low 
levels to a fall in the liquidity ratio and to changes in foreign explanatory variables. This is 
admittedly a first rather crude test of asymmetric behaviour.  
 Equation (1) can be considered a reaction function of the Bank of Austria-Hungary 
distinguishing between three objectives of monetary policy: the objective of defending and 
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increasing the metal stock before internal convertibility of outstanding banknotes into gold was 
reached (1902) and defending the gold stock in order to keep convertibility after it was reached, the 
objective of keeping exchange rates within the gold points (only after 1895) and a third objective, 
not completely independent from the other two, of acting defensively to changes in foreign 
discount rates. Concerning the latter objective one should keep in mind that movements in opposite 
directions of the official discount rates within one month were rare during the period. 
 Reaction functions of Central Banks estimated for the post World-War II period usually 
include inflation, unemployment or deviation of real GDP from trend or from potential GDP8. 
However, the classical gold standard was a different time when national account data were not 
available, unemployment was not a major issue and concerns about financial stability probably 
prevailed over those about the business cycle. As a result this different specification of the reaction 
function seems perfectly justified by the different historical background of the two periods. 
 Turning to the second equation, the one explaining the liquidity ratio, we follow Sommariva 
and Tullio (1987) in assuming that changes in the liquidity ratio depend on the differential between 
the private and the official discount rate in Vienna (henceforth called “the differential”). The 
liquidity ratio is also assumed to depend on the same set of variables capturing international 
influences used in equation (1), namely market exchange rates and foreign official discount rates. 
The inclusion of foreign variables allows, like for equation (1), to test how the degree of Vienna’s  
international financial market integration changed through time and to check the assumption of bi-
polarity or multipolarity of the classical gold standard. 
The equation to be estimated is: 
 




P21i ++D+-+=D å  
 
where ilD  denotes a change in the liquidity ratio of the Bank of Austria-Hungary and 
A
p )ii( -  
denotes the differential between the private discount rate in Vienna and the official discount rate of 
the Bank. The residuals are denoted by  u. All other variables have already been defined above. 
Like for equation (1) we shall use a narrow )1i( =  and a broad (i = 2) definition of the liquidity 
ratio and D does not denote the usual difference operator, since in our data set the changes refer to 
differently spaced time points.  
 Equation (2) states that the main domestic determinant of changes in the liquidity ratio is the 
differential which reflects the situation of the domestic business cycle and the liquidity position of 
                                                 
8This approach has become popular as the so called Taylor rule, especially since the work by Taylor (1993). 
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the Austro-Hungarian financial market. Not surprisingly in VN the differential is called the 
“tension” (Spannung in German). The differential must have had very high informative contents for 
the markets and the monetary authorities alike. An increase in the differential put the Bank of 
Austria-Hungary under strain as it led to an increased demand for rediscounting on the part of 
commercial banks and to an increased demand for notes, gold and Central Bank credit by the 
private sector9. The channels between the business cycle and the liquidity ratio or its components 
have been studied by Goodhart (1972) for the United Kingdom and McGouldrick (1984) and 
Sommariva and Tullio (1987) for Germany. Unfortunately we cannot introduce the business cycle 
into this model because we have no data on industrial production or GDP comparable to those of 
VN.  
 The expected signs of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are: negative for the 
differential, negative for changes in foreign official discount rates and negative for the deviation of 
the exchange rate from gold parity.  
 
2. Description of the data used. 
 The data used in this paper are obtained from VN. This two volume publication contains 
monthly and annual financial data for seven European countries: Austria-Hungary, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Holland, the United Kingdom and Russia. For four countries: France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom and Austria-Hungary there are more detailed tables containing a wealth of 
data relating to each official discount rate change. For Austria-Hungary the relevant table is Table 
136, pages 256-259 of Vol. 2.  
 The one and a half page long introduction to this set of tables contains the following 
sentence: “These tables represent an attempt to explain with a purely numerical methodology those 
factors taken into consideration in deciding changes in the discount rate at the time the changes 
were enacted. These factors were the balance sheet of the Central Bank on the days prior to the 
change, confronted with another balance sheet chosen on purpose by the compilers of the table 
(italic our addition), the foreign exchanges and some foreign discount rates” (VN, page 238). This 
sentence and the data description which follows go a long way in explaining what the German 
compilers were aiming at. They certainly knew very well, long before these concepts became 
current, what a reaction or an objective function of a Central Bank is. 
 To facilitate the description of the data we have constructed Table 1 below, directly derived 
from Table 136 of VN, containing the variables we have used in the empirical work for the first 15 
episodes of discount rate changes. Column 1 reports the date of the change in the official discount 
                                                 
9At that time the Bank of Austria-Hungary was also operating as a commercial bank. 
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rate, which is given in column 2. This is the dependent variable of equation (1) )i( AD . Column 3 
contains a date close to the discount rate change. It generally refers to one to five working days 
prior to the discount rate change. In 5 cases the date is contemporaneous to the discount rate 
change and in 14 cases the date follows the day of the discount rate change by 1 to 4 days. Column 
4 contains a date preceding the discount rate change by one week to two months and on some 
occasions by substantially more. The compilers were interested in eliminating disturbances caused 
by seasonal factors or special events and sometimes they went back a full year. In Table 136 the 
items of the balance sheet of the Bank of Austria-Hungary are recorded at these two dates. The 
choice of these two dates and hence of the interval over which the changes in the liquidity ratios 
are measured was made by the compilers of the tables and may have been based on the knowledge 
of the daily statements actually used by the Board of Directors to decide changes in the discount 
rate10. 
Column 5 contains changes in the narrow liquidity ratio measured between the dates reported 
in columns 3 and 4. This liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of the gold and silver stock to 
banknotes issued by the Bank of Austria-Hungary. Column 6 contains changes in the broad 
liquidity ratio measured over the same period. This liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of the gold 
and silver stock to the sum of banknotes issued and short term liabilities outstanding. Column 7 
contains the differential between the private discount rate of major commercial banks in Vienna 
and the official discount rate of the Bank of Austria-Hungary on the day prior to the discount rate 
change. Column 8 shows the number of Florins/Crowns per 10 Pounds in London )e( E . 
Turning to the changes of the foreign official discount rates in Great Britain )i( ED , France 
)i( FD , and Germany )i( DD , they are reported in columns 9 to 11. The information contained in 
Table 136 of VN is not sufficient to construct these series. For their construction we used 
information contained in other tables of VN. As for these three foreign countries VN contains daily 
figures of the official discount rate for the whole period 1876-1913, we calculated for each of the 
50 episodes of changes in the Austro-Hungarian official discount rate the corresponding changes in 
the three foreign ones with reference to the interval starting with the date given in column 4 of 
Table 1 and ending one day before the discount rate change. Thus same-day changes in foreign 
official discount rates are excluded by construction. In the case of same-day changes we do not 
always know which Central Bank made the first move. Only in some cases of same-day changes  
 
 
                                                 
10We hasten to add that this is our own supposition.  
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Table 1: Discount rate changes of the Central Bank of Austria-Hungary, 1876 – 1913. Some representative data at the beginning of the period. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 













2lD  Ap )ii( -  
Ee  DiD  EiD  FiD  
1 1/28/1876 -0.5 1/26/1876 1/5/1876 2.4 3.0 -0.250 114.40 -1.0 1.0 0.0 
2 5/9/1879 -0.5 5/7/1879 1/7/1879 3.5 3.6 -0.500 117.40 -1.5 -3.0 0.0 
3 10/20/1882 1.0 10/15/1882 8/31/1882 -0.2 0.1 1.000 119.50 1.0 1.0 0.0 
4 2/3/1883 -0.5 1/31/1883 1/7/1883 2.0 2.3 -0.750 119.70 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 
5 2/23/1883 -0.5 2/23/1883 1/7/1883 2.4 2.7 -0.875 119.75 -1.0 1.5 -0.5 
6 10/7/1887 0.5 10/7/1887 9/7/1887 -4.6 -4.7 0.000 125.60 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 1/11/1888 -0.5 1/15/1888 1/1/1888 1.4 0.9 -0.625 126.80 0.0 -0.5 0.0 
8 9/11/1888 0.5 9/7/1888 3/23/1888 -8.1 -7.8 0.500 122.00 0.0 1.0 0.0 
9 1/25/1889 -0.5 1/23/1889 1/1/1889 5.6 5.6 -0.750 120.60 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 
10 11/6/1889 1.0 10/31/1889 3/23/1889 -9.5 -9.3 0.625 118.70 2.0 2.0 0.0 
11 1/24/1890 -0.5 1/23/1890 1/1/1890 5.2 -5.8 -1.000 118.20 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12 2/14/1890 -0.5 2/15/1890 1/23/1890 0.3 -1.0 -1.000 119.40 0.0 0.0 0.0 
13 9/5/1890 0.5 9/7/1890 2/23/1890 -6.1 -5.8 0.250 111.80 0.0 -1.0 0.0 
14 10/3/1890 0.5 9/30/1890 9/7/1890 -0.3 -0.1 0.000 112.80 1.0 1.0 0.0 
15 10/17/1890 0.5 10/15/1890 9/7/1890 -1.4 -1.4 0.375 114.80 1.5 1.0 0.0 
 







can the direction of causation be found by reading the minutes of the meetings of Central Bank’s 
Boards11.  
To summarize five observations are in order. First, the data presented in Table 1 can be 
divided into four main categories: A.  Information on the balance sheet items of the Central Bank, 
in other words on its assets and liabilities. B.  The differential between the private and the official 
discount rate in Vienna on the day prior to the change in the official discount rate. C. The market 
exchange rate with reference to the British Pound on the day preceding the change in the discount 
rate. D.  The changes in the official discount rates in Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Germany and 
France. 
 Second, the series contained in each column are not equally spaced chronologically ordered 
data; hence the frequency of the data is variable depending on the time elapsed between one 
discount rate change and the next. Third, there is virtually no degree of discretion on our part in the 
way the series were constructed. How the variables were constructed follows logically from a 
careful analysis of Table 136 in VN. Fourth, the compilers of the table were not just statisticians, 
they were economic historians writing a history of the gold standard in numbers. We presume that 
they must have had substantial inside information on how decisions were taken and on how the 
system was actually working. They may have written the book with some degree of longing for 
stability in international monetary matters which in 1925 was nowhere near in sight. They may have 
written it with the same spirit which guided Egyptian scholars in the third and second centuries BC 
to write down as much as they could about their disappearing culture12.  
 Fifth, recalling that between 1876 and 1913 the Bank of Austria-Hungary changed the official 
discount rate 50 times13, varying from a minimum of 0 in 1877-78, 1880-81, 1884-86, 1897, 1903-
04, 1909 to a maximum of 5 in 1890, it is clear that the use of annual data, as for example in 
Bloomfield (1959), hides a substantial amount of information and certainly entails problems of 
reverse causation between changes in the discount rate and changes in the liquidity ratio. This may 
hold also for monthly data, albeit to a much smaller degree. 
 
                                                 
11 For instance from the minutes of the meetings of the Board of the Banque de France we know that on 5 or 6 
occasions the Governor read a telegram from London, usually at the very beginning of the meeting, announcing a 
change in the Bank of England’s discount rate and that a (same-day) change in the Banque de France’s discount rate 
was decided (see Tullio and Wolters, 2003). 
12Most of the written Egyptian documents concerning the Egyptian culture date from these last centuries. 
13 The average number of changes per year was 1.3 for Austria-Hungary as opposed to 3.6 for Germany, 5.8 for Great 
Britain and only 0.9 for France. 
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3. The determinants of the official discount rate 
 In this section we present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) using the 
data described in Section 2 and including exchange rates and foreign discount rates among the 
explanatory variables14. Since the Bank of Austria-Hungary changed the official discount rate 50 
times between 1876 and 1913 our sample includes 50 observations. We started out with all the 
explanatory variables and then eliminated successively all those which were not significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level of significance. 
 Our “not equally spaced chronologically ordered data” exclude by construction all episodes 
on which the balance sheet of the Bank, the situation of foreign exchanges and recent changes in 
foreign discount rates were analysed and the decision was taken not to change the discount rate. 
This exclusion may lead some people to believe that the coefficients we estimate are biased. The 
question is: biased with respect to what? For instance in equation (1) the estimated coefficient of 
changes in the liquidity ratio is certainly higher in absolute value than in the case we had used 
equally spaced data. However, we simply do not have such data. On the other hand comparing the 
alleged bias in the coefficients estimated by us with coefficients estimated using for example 
monthly data is wrong first because our data is of a different nature and second because the 
coefficient estimated with monthly data may be strongly biased towards zero, especially if a large 
proportion of the changes in the discount rate occurred at the beginning of the month and if the gold 
stock of the Central Bank changed significantly in the expected direction within the month as a 
result of the change in discount rate itself.  
 Table 2 shows the estimates of equation (1) using the narrow and the broad definition of the 
liquidity ratio. The levels of the liquidity ratio never turned out to be significant implying that, at 
least according to this rudimentary test, there is no indication of asymmetric behaviour on the part 
of the Bank15. Of all foreign explanatory variables, only the changes in the German official discount 
rate had a weakly significant influence. The coefficients of the changes in the liquidity ratios and in 
the German discount rate have the expected sign. A one percentage point increase in the narrow 
liquidity ratio led on average to a 4.9 basis point reduction in the discount rate and a one percentage 
point increase in the broad one led to a 5.7 basis point reduction. An increase of 100 basis points in  
 
                                                 
14Computations are done with Eviews 4.0. 
15 The lack of evidence of asymmetric behaviour on the part of the Bank of Austria-Hungary is also confirmed by a 
more sophisticated test which consists first in dividing the observations into two categories, those relating to periods of 
stress (characterized by increases in the discount rate) and those relating to periods of ease (characterized by 
reductions), then in multiplying all explanatory variables with two dummy variables, DP which is equal to 1 when    ? iA  
is positive and zero otherwise and DN=1-DP and finally in estimating equation (1) again. To save space the results are 
not presented in this paper.   
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Table 2:  The determinants of the official discount rate for the period 1876 – 1913  (T = 50) 
 
 (1) (2) 





1lD  -0.049 
(5.5) 
 
2lD   -0.057 
(5.3) 




2R  0.667 0.660 
DW 2.44 2.38 
AIC 1.006 1.028 



















Absolute values of the t-statistics are given in parantheses, p-values in brackets.  DW denotes the Durbin-
Watson statistic.  Q(10) denotes the Box-Pierce Portmanteau statistic with 10 lags to test for white noise in 
the residuals.  HET is the White test for heteroskedasticity in the residuals.  The RESET test tests against 
specification errors.  The Akaike (Schwarz) information criterium is denoted as AIC (SC).  
 
the German discount rate led on average to an increase of 12 to 13 basis points in the Austro-
Hungarian discount rate. The regressions of Table 2 explain about 66% of the variance of AiD . The 
fact that the explanatory power of the two regressions is the same may suggest that for the Bank of 
Austria-Hungary the narrow and the broad liquidity ratio were equally important. At the 5% 
confidence level the residuals of the regressions pass all the misspecification tests.  
 The stability tests for the regressions of Table 2 are presented in Figures 1 and 2. The Cusum 
of Squares test for regression (1) presented in Figure 1 shows that at the 5% confidence level the 
regression tends to become unstable at around observation 33 which corresponds to the discount 
rate reduction of February 6, 1900, the third of an uninterrupted string of 5 reductions over the 
period from December 7, 1899 to February 5, 1902. On September 21, 1899 the charter of the Bank 
was renewed and the dispute between the two sides of the empire about the control of the Bank was 
finally settled, making the 1892 monetary reform at long last a credible step towards formal entry 
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into the gold standard (Flandreau, 2003). Formal entry occurred in 1902. As to regression (2), 
which uses the broad liquidity ratio, the Cusum of Squares test in Figure 2 shows that at the 5% 
confidence level the regression tends to become unstable between observation 19 and 32. This 





































Figure 1: Recursive coefficients and CUSUM of Squares-test
for regression (1) of Table 2
 
 Figures 1 and 2 also show the recursive parameter estimates. For both regressions the figures 
show a steady decline in the influence of the German discount rate over time and large changes in 
the coefficients of the liquidity ratios. The coefficient of the narrow liquidity ratio stabilizes after 
observation 33, corresponding to February 6, 1900 whereas the coefficient of the broad liquidity 
ratio stabilizes after observation 25 which corresponds to February 14, 1896. As explained before, 
the progress towards adoption of the gold standard was slow in Austria-Hungary, and it proceeded 
in steps. At the beginning of 1896 the Bank started to shadow the gold standard by intervening in 
the foreign exchange market and successfully stabilizing the currency within a band of 










































Figure 2: Recursive coefficients and CUSUM of Squares-test
for regression (2) of Table 2
 
 The recursive parameter estimates of Figures 1 and 2 suggest a division of the period into 
two. Taking the beginning of the shadowing of the gold standard by Vienna as the dividing line, we 
decided to consider the sub-periods 1876-1895 and 1896-1913. The chosen subdivision of the 
period is also justified by several additional historical facts. Among them should be mentioned the 
end of the long period of declining prices in the gold standard world, in connection with the 
discovery of new gold mines and of a new process to extract gold, and the end, in the late 1880s and 
early 1890s, of a period characterized by a more intensive use of gold devices on the part of the 
Banque de France and the Bank of England16. Other important developments to justify the split were 
the improved communication and transportation technology, the increased degree of financial 
market integration worldwide, the increased economic and financial weight of Germany in the 
world economy and the development of the Pound as an international reserve currency.  
Owing to the insufficient number of observations, we did not estimate equation (1) separately 
for these two sub-periods. Instead we defined a dummy variable D1 which is equal to one for 
observations 1 to 23 (1876 to 1895) and zero otherwise and a dummy variable D2 which is equal to 
                                                 
16See Scammel (1965), Sayers (1976) and Tullio and Wolters (2003). 
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1-D1 (1 from 1896 to 1913 and zero otherwise). We then multiplied D1 and D2 with DiD  and with 
ilD  and ran the regressions again with the new explanatory variables thus defined. The results are 
presented in Table 3. 
Wald-F tests applied to the coefficients of regressions (1) and (2) in Table 3, which use the 
narrow liquidity ratio, show that at the 10% level of significance the coefficients of changes in the  
 
Table 3:  The determinants of the official discount rate for the period 1876 – 1913  (T = 50) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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2R  0.727 0.732 0.687 0.700 
DW 2.24 2.23 2.11 2.15 
AIC 0.845 0.806 0.980 0.903 
SC 1.036 0.959 1.171 1.017 













































Notes:  See Table 2 
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liquidity ratio are different. Changes in the liquidity ratio have a smaller influence on the discount 
rate in the second period, confirming the recursive parameter estimates of Figure 1. This finding 
may be the result of more relaxed stance of the Bank in relation to the size of its stock of metals, 
after the latter had increased enough to allow the move to the gold standard. Germany’s discount 
rate was weakly significant only in the first sub-period.  
Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 3 using the broad liquidity ratio show that there is no 
significant difference between the coefficients of changes in the liquidity ratio in the two sub-
periods. The German discount rate is significant at the 1% level only in the first sub-period. The 
residuals of all regressions in Table 3 are well behaved. By splitting the period, the explanatory 
power of all regressions, measured by the Adjusted R2’s, AIC and SC, shows a marked 
improvement with respect to the results of Table 2. 
In the next section we shall analyse the domestic and international determinants of the 
liquidity ratios of the Imperial Bank of Austria-Hungary (equation (2) of Section 1). They are the 
main determinants of the official discount rate. We shall see, among other things, that foreign 
official discount rates exert their effects on Vienna’s discount rate also indirectly via changes in the 
liquidity ratios. 
 
4. The determinants of the liquidity ratios 
 In this section we present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (2) using the 
data described in Section 2 and including exchange rates and foreign discount rates among the 
explanatory variables17. We started out with all the explanatory variables and then eliminated 
successively all those which were not significantly different from zero at the 10% level. 
 Table 4 shows the estimates of equation (2) for the whole period. The most significant 
explanatory variable is the differential between the private and the official discount rate in Vienna. 
The coefficient of this variable has the expected negative sign. A 100 basis points higher differential 
implies a reduction of 6.8 to 6.9 percentage points in the narrow liquidity ratio and of 5.6 in the 
broad one. The German official discount rate always has a highly significant and negative effect as 
expected. A 100 basis point increase in the German discount rate implies a reduction of 2.5 to 3.5 
percentage points in the liquidity ratio, depending on the specification of the estimated equation. 
Changes in the discount rate of the Banque de France also have the expected negative influence on 
                                                 
17 A few words are in order concerning the days on which the compilers of VN reported the tension and the final day of 
the period over which the changes in the liquidity ratio are measured (reference period). In 25 out of 50 cases the 
tension is measured one to 6 days after the end of the reference period.  For regressions with time series the explanatory 
variables should normally not be measured at a date later than the date of the dependent variable. We do not think that 
this constitutes a problem in our case mainly because the differential measures the accumulation of tensions over a time 
span which may be as long as or even longer than the reference interval. In addition if the reference period is generally 
two weeks to two months long, a few days’ lead of the differential do not matter. 
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Table 4:  The determinants of the liquidity ratios for the period 1876 – 1913  (T = 50) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 




















FiD  -4.869 
(1.9) 
  
2R  0.661 0.641 0.652 
DW 1.88 1.67 1.86 
AIC 6.230 6.268 5.950 


























Notes:  See Table 2 
 
the Austro-Hungarian narrow liquidity ratio (see regression 1). However, since the changes in the 
French and German official discount rates are highly multicollinear, in the remainder of this section, 
we prefer the specification without the French discount rate18. The regressions presented in Table 4 
explain from 64 to 66 percent of the variance of changes in the liquidity ratios. The residuals are 
well behaved. 
Figure 3 presents the stability tests of regression (2). The Cusum of Squares test shows that 
the estimated relationship is unstable at the 5% significance level. The Cusum of Squares test 
statistic moves outside the 5% confidence band from observation 17 to 32. These observations 
correspond to the period from February 5, 1891 to January 22, 1900. As explained in the 
introduction and in Section 3, during this period Austria-Hungary implemented a monetary reform 
(1892), adopted the policy of shadowing the gold standard (1896), passed into law a new charter of 
the Imperial Bank of Austria-Hungary thus resolving the long dispute between the two sides of the 
empire over the control of the Bank (1899) and moved to formal adherence to the gold standard in 
                                                 
18 The elimination of the French discount rate does not worsen the Schwarz (SC) criteria. 
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1902. The recursive parameter estimates, also shown in Figure 3, suggest an increasing influence of 
the differential and of the German discount rate on the narrow liquidity ratio over time. The German 
influence is not significant during the sub-period from 1876 to 1895.  
Figure 4 shows the stability tests for regression (3) of Table 4. According to the Cusum of 
Squares test the equation is stable and the coefficient of changes in the German discount rate is 
significant throughout the period and stable. The coefficient of the differential increases over time 
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Figure 3: Recursive coefficients and CUSUM of Squares-test
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Figure 4: Recursive coefficients and CUSUM of Squares-test
for regression (3) of Table 4
 
 
In order to further investigate the changes over time of the determinants of the liquidity ratio, 
we split the period into two sub-periods as in Section 3, and used the dummy variables D1 and D2 
already defined, to re-estimate regressions (2) and (3) of Table 4. The results are presented in Table 
5. The Wald-F tests, shown in the lower part of the table, indicate that the coefficients of the 
differential are significantly different between the two periods. They increase in absolute value by 
roughly two times for the narrow liquidity ratio and three times for the broad one. This implies that 
in the second period the domestic financial market had become more efficient in transmitting to the 
liquidity ratios of the Bank information about the business cycle and the state of financial markets. 
As already suggested by the recursive parameter estimates, the effect of the German discount rate is 
significant only in the second period for the narrow liquidity ratio, while for the broad one the effect 
remains strong and highly significant over the whole period. By allowing for differences in the 




Table 5:  The determinants of the liquidity ratios for the period 1876 – 1913  (T = 50) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 







































DiD     -2.889 
(4.6) 
2R  0.757 0.759 0.751 0.747 
DW 1.61 1.62 1.73 1.78 
AIC 5.915 5.890 5.653 5.648 
SC 6.107 6.043 5.845 5.801 














































Notes:  See Table 2 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we presented estimates of two equations which jointly explain monetary policy 
in Austro-Hungary during the period from 1876 to 1913. The first equation explains the official 
discount rate of the Central Bank as a function of the liquidity ratio and the German official 
discount rate. This equation can be considered as a reaction function of the Bank of Austria-
Hungary. The second equation explains changes in the liquidity ratio as a function of the differential 
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between the private and the official discount rate in Vienna and of changes in the German official 
discount rate. Two liquidity ratios are used in this paper, a narrow and a broad one.  
The data used are from Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik (1925) referring to all episodes of 
discount rate changes enacted by the Bank during the period. Since there were 50 such changes we 
have 50 observations. The data used is “not equally spaced chronologically ordered”. We present 
stability tests in order to study if and how institutional changes affected the determination of the 
official discount rate and the liquidity ratios. 
Although the Austro-Hungarian Empire formally joined the gold standard only in 1902, it 
tried from the beginning of the period to approach the gold standard, which meant in the first place 
accumulating sufficient gold to make the internal convertibility of notes into gold viable. During the 
long period of convergence it shadowed the behaviour of gold standard Central Banks by increasing 
the official discount rate when metal reserves (consisting of silver and gold) were low and reducing 
it when they were high. This policy was pursued also in times of inconvertible paper currency 
(1879-1892) and fluctuating exchange rates (1876-1895). 
 The estimates presented in this paper suggest the following main conclusions. First, changes 
in the liquidity ratios were the main determinant of changes in the discount rate throughout the 
period, despite the lack of internal convertibility of outstanding banknotes into gold until 1902. 
Second, throughout the period the differential between the private and the official discount rate in 
Vienna played an important role in transmitting disturbances from the real economy and from 
domestic financial markets to the Bank’s liquidity ratios, and hence ultimately to the official 
discount rate, confirming an hypothesis first advanced by Goodhart (1972) for Great Britain. Third, 
of the three main gold standard countries (Great Britain, Germany and France), only Germany 
played a significant role in determining the official Austro-Hungarian discount rate and the liquidity 
ratios. Changes in the German official discount rate were affecting the official discount rate in 
Vienna mainly directly in the first period and mainly indirectly in the second. Fourth, the fact that 
only Germany and not Great Britain had significant effects on monetary policy in Austria-Hungary 
has an important implication for the role of London as the “conductor of the international orchestra” 
view suggested by Keynes (1930).  Keynes thought that the classical gold standard was a system 
fully managed by London in which the impulses moved unidirectionally from London to the 
periphery of the system. Eichengreen (1992) suggested instead that the classical gold standard was 
rather a decentralized multipolar system or at least a bi-polar one19. The findings of this paper are in 
                                                 
19 See also Tullio and Wolters (1996, 2000). 
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line with Eichengreen’s view insofar as Great Britain played no role in explaining monetary policy 
in Austria-Hungary.  
 Fifth, we analyse the stability of all estimated regressions. In general we find evidence of 
instabilities during the period from about 1892 to 1900. This interval is characterized by important 
institutional changes in the Austro-Hungarian monetary system, which have been described in the 
introduction. Despite these instabilities in the estimated regressions, well justified by the 
institutional changes, the paper shows that the two equations presented can be estimated for the 
whole period 1876-1913 and that the objectives of the Bank of Austria-Hungary changed much less 
through time than the institutional framework it was confronted with. In this respect the superb 
economic historians and authors of VN (1925) who compiled the table also for Austria-Hungary 
were right to put the country on the same footing as Great Britain, France and Germany. Sixth, 
allowing for different coefficients of the explanatory variables before and after 1895, we find 
significant improvements in the explanatory power and in the stability of the regressions. Seventh, 
the estimates of equation (2) in Section 4 show that the model is able to explain changes in the 
broad liquidity ratio better than changes in the narrow one. In particular the estimated regression for  
2lD  is stable for the whole period while the one for ? l1 is not. This may suggest that the broad 
liquidity ratio and its stabilization was more important for the Bank of Austria-Hungary than the 
first one, which may not be unrelated to the fact that for Austro-Hungarian paper currency and bank 
liabilities were more engrained than in other gold standard countries. In this respect Austria-
Hungary’s monetary system was a precursor of the ones which emerged after World War II.  
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